yindle

Documented Deviations from OpenPrinting CUPS

Yindle targets drop-in wire, configuration, spool, and filter/backend compatibility with OpenPrinting CUPS 2.x on Linux. Where Yindle intentionally differs from upstream CUPS—chiefly to eliminate classes of security vulnerabilities by default—or where an upstream capability is on the roadmap rather than yet shipped, it is recorded here.

Any behavioral difference not listed on this page should be treated as a compatibility bug and reported via the Compatibility Report template.


1. Intentional Security-First Defaults

Yindle flips several permissive upstream defaults to fail-closed settings so a fresh installation or migration cannot silently expose administrative controls or arbitrary file/network primitives.

Area OpenPrinting CUPS 2.x Yindle Rationale & Escape Hatch
Default Satisfy mode Satisfy any inside <Location> / <Limit> unless Satisfy all is explicit Satisfy all (crates/cups-config/src/types.rs, crates/authz) Prevents an Order deny,allow block with empty Allow/Deny rules from bypassing Require user @SYSTEM or Require user @OWNER. Legacy configs that rely on Satisfy any can declare it explicitly; cupsd --check-config flags authenticated Satisfy any blocks (LOCATION_SATISFY_ANY / POLICY_SATISFY_ANY).
Systemd socket binding cups.socket ships ListenStream=631 (binds 0.0.0.0:631 and [::]:631 globally) Loopback-only (127.0.0.1:631, [::1]:631, /run/cups/cups.sock) in data/systemd/cups.socket Installing a print spooler must never expose TCP/631 to untrusted LANs by accident. Operators opt into network listeners explicitly via systemctl edit cups.socket alongside TLS (SSLListen / Encryption Required). See docs/operations.md.
LPD socket & service Often runs as root or binds wildcard port 515 Loopback-only (127.0.0.1:515, [::1]:515), User=lp, MaxConnections=64, MaxConnectionsPerSource=16, bounded temp spool (100 MiB default) RFC 1179 LPD is an unauthenticated legacy protocol. Override via systemctl edit cups-lpd.socket and firewall rules if LAN LPD clients are required.
Unmatched <Policy> operations Permissive fallback in edge configurations Fail-closed (authz::check_op denies when no <Limit> matches) Every one of the 68 dispatched IPP operations requires an explicit <Limit> or <Limit All> match under the effective policy (printer-op-policy -> DefaultPolicy -> default).
Identity & host trust Some legacy code paths consult client-supplied attributes Verified identity & peer IP only Authorization never falls back to untrusted IPP requesting-user-name or HTTP Host: headers; invalid Authorization headers return 401 Unauthorized without falling back to SO_PEERCRED. Host: headers are validated against ServerName and ServerAlias to block DNS rebinding.
FileDevice enforcement FileDevice No in default config Strict fail-closed enforcement in both ops and cups-backend-file file:// device URIs are rejected unless explicitly allowed by FileDevice in cups-files.conf. When enabled, cups-backend-file truncates targets with 0600 + O_NOFOLLOW, rejecting symlinks and FIFOs.
Print-URI / Send-URI May fetch local file:// URIs depending on build/policy file:// scheme forbidden Prevents unauthenticated or cross-user arbitrary local file disclosure via Print-URI + CUPS-Get-Document.
PPD & filter validation Permissive string parsing in legacy libppd/cupsd Strict validation & containment Uploaded/patched PPDs reject CR/LF injection, whitespace qualifiers, Foomatic command-injection patterns, *cupsFilter/*cupsFilter2 absolute paths or .. traversal, and untrusted executable permissions. CUPS-Get-PPD enforces canonical root containment and rejects drv:////... absolute-path escapes.
Spool, config & TLS permissions Historically 0644 on some spool/config artifacts Atomic 0600 spool files, 0640 configs, 0700/0600 TLS Job files (c*, d*) are written atomically (O_EXCL \| O_NOFOLLOW, 0600). printers.conf, classes.conf, and subscriptions.conf use atomic O_NOFOLLOW writes honoring ConfigFilePerm (0640). /etc/cups/ssl is 0700, private keys are 0600, and existing admin certs/keys are never overwritten on parse errors.
Filter/backend sandboxing Platform-specific (macOS Seatbelt; relaxed on Linux) Privilege drop + umask 077 + rlimits + PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS + Linux Landlock via cups-exec Filters and backends run via direct execv (no shell), env_clear(), expanded prohibited env blocklist (LD_*, PATH, IFS, HTTP_PROXY, PYTHONPATH, etc.), and DEVICE_URI stripped from filters. lp is never added to lpadmin. Landlock activates automatically on Linux kernels >= 5.13 and gracefully degrades to privdrop + NO_NEW_PRIVS + rlimits + systemd hardening on older kernels.
Outbound backend SSRF guard Network backends connect to any IP/hostname Built-in SsrfPolicy in backend-common Network backends (ipp, lpd, socket, snmp, dnssd) validate every DNS resolution result and block unspecified (0.0.0.0, ::), link-local/cloud metadata (169.254.0.0/16, 100.100.100.200, fe80::/10, fd00:ec2::254, and IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms), broadcast/multicast, and loopback (127.0.0.0/8, ::1). Set CUPS_ALLOW_LOOPBACK_BACKENDS=yes to explicitly allow loopback backend targets (for example, local print gateways or test harnesses).
HTTP/1.1 parser strictness Tolerates certain non-RFC HTTP quirks Strict anti-smuggling parser (crates/httpd) Rejects simultaneous Transfer-Encoding + Content-Length, duplicate Content-Length, whitespace before :, obs-fold, bare \n\n, and malformed chunk CRLFs; closes connections immediately on 400/408/413/431/505; returns 413 Payload Too Large before 100 Continue; enforces Slowloris header/body/write/keep-alive timeouts and disk-spooled large bodies.
TLS protocol & cipher floor OpenSSL/GnuTLS with optional legacy TLS 1.0/1.1/CBC rustls TLS 1.2+ with AEAD cipher suites only SSLOptions MinTLS1.2/MinTLS1.3/MaxTLS1.2/MaxTLS1.3 and DenyCBC are enforced. Legacy SSLv3, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, RC4, and CBC suites are not supported (and are flagged by cupsd --check-config). See SECURITY.md for FIPS 140-3 guidance regarding aws-lc-rs/ring.

2. Runtime, Packaging, and Operational Differences

External cups-filters Runtime Dependency

Yindle ships the scheduler (cupsd), helper daemons (cups-deviced, cups-driverd, cups-exec, cups-lpd), cupsfilter, and all 9 standard backends (socket, file, ipp, lpd, snmp, usb, dnssd, serial, parallel). It does not reimplement OpenPrinting’s document conversion filters (pstops, pdftopdf, pdftoraster, rastertopwg, foomatic-rip, etc.).

Dynamic PAM and libcrypt Resolution (dlopen)

Instead of linking against a distribution-specific libpam or libcrypt.so.1 soname at compile time, crates/sys resolves authentication libraries dynamically at runtime:

Pure-Rust D-Bus Wire Notifier

crates/cups-dbus publishes standard org.cups.cupsd.Notifier signals (/org/cups/cupsd/Notifier) directly over the D-Bus v1 Unix socket wire protocol (/run/dbus/system_bus_socket, SASL EXTERNAL) with zero external C library dependencies. When no system D-Bus daemon is present (such as inside minimal containers), the notifier degrades gracefully to a no-op without blocking startup.

Built-In Observability, Diagnostics, and Web UI Fallback

Yindle extends the stock cupsd surface with enterprise-native endpoints and CLI tools while staying 100% compatible with existing IPP clients:

Spool Compatibility Enhancements

Local Hardware Backend Notes


3. Transparent Roadmap (Not Yet Implemented)

The following upstream or enterprise capabilities are not yet shipped in Yindle and are tracked on the roadmap:

Capability Current Status Planned Direction
HTTP/2 transport (h2) HTTP/1.1 with keep-alive, chunked transfer, Expect: 100-continue, and RFC 2817 TLS upgrade are shipped. Add optional HTTP/2 (h2) listener support alongside HTTP/1.1.
OpenTelemetry (OTLP) export Prometheus /metrics and structured JSON logs are shipped. Add optional OTLP trace and metric export for distributed tracing across IPP requests and filter pipelines.
Native Kerberos/GSSAPI (Negotiate) & OAuth2/OIDC providers crates/authn provides the extensible TokenVerifier trait for Bearer tokens, and cups-config parses GSSServiceName, OAuthServer, OAuthScopes, and OAuthGroup; runtime authentication currently executes PAM, /etc/shadow, SO_PEERCRED, and mTLS. Ship built-in SPNEGO/GSSAPI (Negotiate) and OIDC JWT/introspection TokenVerifier adapters.
Push notification schemes (mailto:, rss:) Pull notifications (ippget with notify-sequence-numbers and notify-wait), persistent subscriptions.conf, and D-Bus org.cups.cupsd.Notifier signals are shipped. Add optional outbound mailto: and rss: notifiers.
IPP System Service (PWG 5100.22) Core CUPS 2.x / IPP 1.0–2.2 and IPP Everywhere (68 operations) are shipped. Implement Get-System-Attributes, Create-Printer, and system-level IPP System Service operations.
colord ICC color profile registration org.cups.cupsd.Notifier D-Bus signals are shipped; colord D-Bus calls are not yet implemented. Add optional colord device/profile registration over D-Bus.
Live /etc/printcap generation Printcap and PrintcapFormat directives are parsed by cups-config. Emit live BSD/Solaris/plist printcap updates on queue mutations.
libusb USB backend & hardware quirk table Kernel usblp (/dev/usb/lp*) backend is shipped. Add optional libusb user-space backend with upstream printer quirk handling.
macOS Tier-2 support Linux is the primary supported platform. Add launchd socket activation, macOS local-cert auth, and IOKit USB support.