yindle

Security Architecture & Threat Model

Yindle is a network-facing print spooler and IPP scheduler that parses untrusted network packets, HTTP headers, configuration files, PPDs, and print documents while coordinating device backends. This document details the threat model, structural defenses, and verification controls shipped in Yindle.

For vulnerability reporting, Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) SLAs, and FIPS 140-3 guidance, see SECURITY.md.


1. Why the September 2024 CUPS RCE Chain Cannot Recur

CVE-2024-47176 / CVE-2024-47076 / CVE-2024-47175 / CVE-2024-47177 demonstrated unauthenticated remote command execution in the C printing stack when attacker-controlled IPP attributes flowed unsanitized into generated PPDs and shell-evaluated filter command lines. Every link in that vulnerability class is structurally eliminated in Yindle:

Stage in the C RCE Chain Yindle Defense Enforcement Location
Untrusted IPP attributes parsed in C Strictly typed, bounded pure-Rust wire codec (#![forbid(unsafe_code)], DecodeLimits) fuzzed with libFuzzer crates/ipp-codec, fuzz/fuzz_targets/ipp_decode.rs
Unsanitized PPD/attribute injection (*cupsFilter, Foomatic, newlines) Strict PPD validation rejects CR/LF, whitespace qualifiers, Foomatic command-injection patterns, *cupsFilter path traversal, and cups* injection; atomic O_NOFOLLOW writes crates/ops/src/ppd.rs
Shell command templating (system() / popen()) Zero shell execution; filters and backends spawn via direct execv-style Vec<OsString> with validated root-owned executable metadata crates/pipeline, bins/cups-exec
Untrusted discovery/network redirection Discovery tokens/fields sanitized against quote/newline injection; outbound network backends enforce SsrfPolicy against metadata, link-local, and loopback targets crates/backend-common
Child process runs with daemon privileges cups-exec drops supplementary groups and drops to non-root User/Group (lp), sets umask 077, rlimits, PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, and Linux Landlock rulesets bins/cups-exec, crates/sys/src/sandbox.rs

2. Memory Safety & unsafe Confinement


3. Privilege Separation, Sandboxing & Process Hardening

Filter & Backend Isolation (crates/pipeline + bins/cups-exec)

Systemd & Container Hardening


4. Network, HTTP, TLS & Backend Defenses

HTTP/1.1 & CGI Hardening (crates/httpd, bins/cupsd)

TLS & Mutual TLS (crates/cups-tls)

Outbound Backend SSRF & Local Device Protection


5. Authentication, Authorization & Auditability


6. Supply Chain, Testing & Continuous Assurance